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Say on Pay and
Compensation Design
What did say on pay
Will shareholder yes votes be
as prevalent when stock prices
aren’t rebounding? The “Financial
Times” reported in July 2011 that
of the first 2,300 meetings of the
Russell 3000 index companies only 1.7 percent (39) had
votes of less than 50 percent and an additional 8.2 percent
(188) had less than than 70 percent of the vote. Is this
a vote of confidence or the first exhibition of newfound
protest powers? Really understanding the significance of
these votes and what might happen next is not so easy. As
one colleague put it, all we are certain of about say on pay
is that its arrival has the new-baby effect — it’s demanding
far more time and energy than expected, and its full impact
on the world won’t be known for years.
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CEO compensation?

One Impact of This Year’s Say on Pay: More Talk
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The 2011 proxy season was the first time publicly traded
firms in the United States were required by law to solicit
from their shareholders advisory yes or no votes on the
pay package awarded to the CEO.
I’ve heard executives, board members, compensation practitioners and shareholder activists all acknowledge devoting
a lot of energy to preparing for these inaugural say on pay
votes. Companies are increasingly engaging their owners —
shareholders (mostly large institutional shareholders) — on
the topic of CEO pay and pay practices in advance of shareholder meetings where the votes take place. Companies’
proxy statements have evolved to be more transparent,
and anecdotal evidence suggests that boards of directors
made pre-vote modifications to compensation plans when
pushback was particularly strong. But, did the heightened
company-shareholder engagement or the transparency
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forced by the say on pay regulation have any systemic or
large-scale impact on the level or mix of CEO pay?

Did Say on Pay Change the Way
Boards Pay Executives?
Trying to determine if say on pay had a material effect
on how companies pay executives is nearly impossible
from one year’s data, but some observations are compelling. In a forthcoming 2011 report I wrote with Judit Torok
from The Conference Board, we analyze the 2009-2010
change in CEO compensation for 2,047 firms publicly
listed in the United States. In this year-to-year matched
set of companies, we found:
❙ In every industry, the median CEO received a raise
(positive year-on-year change) in total CEO
compensation. For example, the median 2009-2010
total CEO pay raise is 26.65 percent in industrial
and transportation equipment, 28.64 percent in
wholesale trade and 36.15 percent in holding
companies. Construction had the smallest median
change, 1.12 percent (positive nonetheless).
❙ The mix of pay shifted some. For example, in the
communications industry, the average share of total
compensation paid in salary fell by 6.53 percentage
points to just over one-quarter (26.12 percent) of total
compensation. At the same time, the share in stock
awards was up 7.35 percentage points to 28.68 percent.
❙ On average, salary’s share of total compensation fell in
all but two of the 22 industries, (with food and tobacco
and non-banking financial services seeing less than a
one-percentage-point gain in the average salary share).
Stock-based pay, on the other hand, increased its average
compensation share in 20 of the 22 industries (only food
and tobacco and commodities saw modest declines).
That these changes occurred in the year that U.S. say on
pay regulation came into effect is not substantive evidence,
however, that the say on pay votes caused these changes. A
year ago, prior to say on pay, Torok and I computed that the
annual median change in total compensation was negative
in 12 of 22 industries, with the year-on-year median CEO
pay hits ranging from cuts of -1.17 percent in textiles and
apparel to -23.38 percent in construction. If 2010’s CEO
compensation outcomes are due to say on pay, then the new
Dodd-Frank regulation caused 12 industries to reverse the
pay cutting they inflicted on CEOs the previous year. Disentangling the measureable effects of say on pay will take
more time and robust statistical analysis. But rest assured,
researchers are working on it.
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What Will Happen to Say on Pay in the Future?
In spring 2011 — the time when many shareholders were
casting their say on pay votes — many companies in the
United States had seen considerable gains in stock prices.
The S&P500, for example, rose more than 24 percent
between the start of July 2010 through the start of July
2011. What will happen in say on pay votes in a year when
the stock market has not done so well?
Imagine a company with a given executive compensation
system in place (e.g., salary at a certain level and fraction of at-risk bonus, restricted stock, stock options, other
compensation, etc. all known). Suppose stock prices rose
(as we saw in spring 2011) and that the say on pay vote was
a 90-percent pass. What if the company has the identical
compensation system in place (all formulas unchanged)
the following year but stock prices fall? How likely is it
that the company will now experience, say, an 80-percent
pass vote, or a 70-percent pass vote? If such a drop in say
on pay affirmation occurs, how much of that percentage
point drop in support do you suppose is due to the stock
price and not to a change of mind about the quality of
the pay system?
In the coming months and years, researchers and practitioners will need to answer many questions, not the lesser
of which are:
❙ What is a good vote of confidence on CEO pay?
Does a vote pass at better than 50 percent in
favor or should a substantially higher vote share
(say, 80 percent or 90 percent or 95 percent) be
necessary to demonstrate shareholder approval?
❙ What should a company do after a negative vote,
whether that be less than 50 percent or even less
than 70 percent or 90 percent? Some critics of
say on pay argue that firms have very little time
to do anything about negative votes since by the
time information is reported in a proxy the organization is already well into its next fiscal.
❙ Is the vote is really about pay or, perhaps, some
other gripe shareholders have with management?
Only time (and a lot of statistical work) will tell.
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The Institute for Compensation Studies (ICS) at Cornell University
analyzes, teaches and communicates about monetary and nonmonetary rewards from work, and how rewards influence individuals, companies,
industries and economies. ICS research and leading-edge insight address
compensation issues challenging employers and employees in today’s dynamic
global marketplace. www.ilr.cornell.edu/ics
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